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Targets’ Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of targets’ participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums in 
mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel dataset in which targets disclose that they have not 
participated in tax shelters, we find that targets that make this statement in their merger filings are 
associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average. This relation is consistent with 
acquirers being are concerned about the potential future liabilities when targets have engaged in 
tax sheltering. Consistent with this interpretation, the positive association between targets’ non-
sheltering disclosure and acquisition premiums is stronger for less tax aggressive acquirers. This 
paper demonstrates the importance of targets’ aggressive tax positions in the determination of 
premiums offered to targets’ shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax shelters are financial arrangements that aim to reduce income tax liability by exploiting 
loopholes in the tax law (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1999). Representing the most 
aggressive form of tax planning, tax shelters generate substantial tax savings for firms. For 
example, Graham and Tucker (2006) find that the median tax deduction associated with using tax 
shelters is more than $1 billion per firm per year, or 9 percent of total assets, for the 24 sample 
firms disclosing an amount. Despite the economic significance of these tax benefits to firms, few 
empirical studies specifically address investors’ assessment of tax sheltering. The reason for this 
lack of research is the difficulty in directly identifying tax shelter participation from firms’ 
financial statements (Hanlon 2003; McGill and Outslay 2004). As a result, extant research has 
generally relied on data from Tax Court records (Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009), press 
releases of tax authority disputes (Brown 2011; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009), and IRS tax shelter 
disclosures (Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt 2013).1  
Understanding how investors assess firms’ tax shelter participation is different from other 
general tax planning transactions because with tax shelters, “it is almost always ambiguous 
whether the transaction is permissible or not” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, p. 137). While 
previous studies have shown that, on average, market participants do not view aggressive tax 
planning to be value-enhancing or destroying (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009),2 no 
prior research has examined the question of how investors view tax shelters from a large sample of 
firms’ disclosures. 
                                                
1 For example, Graham and Tucker (2006, p. 565) note that information about tax sheltering is “notoriously 
hard to find” because firms rarely disclose their use of tax shelters publicly. The use of data on tax court 
records or press releases results in a relatively small sample, and the IRS tax shelter disclosures data is 
confidential. 
2 These studies assume that investors understand firms’ tax strategies and therefore all the risks and rewards 
of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). We argue below that firms have strong incentives to showcase 
the benefits derived from aggressive tax planning but obfuscate the negative consequences. Consistent with 
our argument, research documents that firms with tax shelters have larger book-tax differences (Lisowsky 
2010; Wilson 2009) and do not voluntarily disclose their participation in publicly available sources. 
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In this paper, we use a novel dataset in which firms’ non-participation in tax shelters is 
directly disclosed during a merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction. Specifically, the research 
design exploits targets’ statements of not participating in tax shelters in the Form 8-K – Agreement 
and Plan of Merger. We assume that targets that state they have not participated in tax shelters in 
their merger agreements are non-sheltering targets. While these disclosures are voluntary, we 
expect that they are made truthfully and that there is little incentive to avoid the disclosure if it can 
be made, as described more fully below. We infer that firms not making this disclosure have 
engaged in tax shelters. These disclosures allow researchers to better identify targets that have not 
participated in tax shelters and therefore classify targets’ tax shelter involvements prior to M&A. 
We study investors’ views of tax sheltering by examining the effect of targets’ tax shelter non-
participation disclosures on takeover premiums.  
M&A provides a strong setting to examine how specific investors perceive the risk-
reward tradeoff of tax sheltering from an informed investors’ viewpoint. During M&A, acquirers 
are able to obtain private information regarding the target’s tax planning through due diligence, 
creating an information advantage about the target’s tax sheltering history.3 Thus, relative to the 
targets’ outside investors, acquirers are more apt to better price the risks and rewards of the 
target’s tax planning activities. In the context of this study, acquirers will have a much better 
gauge on the target’s IRS audit and penalty risks (Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000), 
information risk (Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 2013; Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Kim, Li, 
and Zhang 2011) and managerial-diversion risk (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006) associated with the target’s tax sheltering history. 
We hand-collect each target’s representation concerning its non-participation in tax 
shelters and use this disclosure to empirically classify their non-sheltering status. Assuming 
                                                
3 This is consistent with the notion of Crocker and Slemrod’s (2005) model that the CFO is assumed to 
possess private information regarding the underlying tax structures and positions, such as the level of 
permissible legal reduction in taxable income. 
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truthful and complete reporting, our results indicate that acquisitions of targets that have not used 
tax shelters are associated with higher takeover premiums, suggesting that acquirers price the 
potential future liabilities related to targets’ past tax shelters. We include common measures of tax 
aggressiveness as additional controls in our regression and find that the five-year cash ETR is also 
associated with takeover premiums, while the Wilson (2009) tax shelter proxy and UTB are not. 
Furthermore, we analyze whether the positive association between targets’ non-participation in tax 
shelters and premium differs across acquirers. Our results indicate that the positive association 
between disclosed non-participation in tax shelters and the takeover premium is significantly 
stronger for less tax aggressive acquirers whose managers may be less familiar with, or potentially 
more opposed to, tax shelters. 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we conduct several additional analyses. First, we 
employ procedures to account for the potential endogeneity associated with the decision to 
disclose the lack of tax sheltering: an endogenous treatment-effects regression and instrumental 
variable regressions. We model the decision to disclose non-participation in tax shelters as a 
function of target characteristics and also use these determinants as instrumental variables. The 
results fail to reveal evidence of endogeneity biasing our estimates. Second, to test the sensitivity 
of our results to possible misreporting by targets, we calculate the targets’ estimated tax shelter 
probability based on Wilson (2009). We find similar results when excluding observations with 
disclosures that are not in line with the probability of participation. 
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the stream of 
literature on the role that taxes play in the pricing and structure of M&A (e.g., Hayn 1989; 
Erickson 1998; Erickson and Wang 2000, 2007; Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003, 2004; 
Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy 2009; Martin, Wang and Zou 2013; Mescall and Klassen 
2014). The focus of this literature has been on taxes arising within, or opportunities resulting from, 
the M&A transaction. The question of whether aggressive tax planning affects M&A has only 
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recently been explored.4 In their comprehensive review, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) observe this 
void in the literature, and call for more research on whether targets’ aggressive tax positions affect 
acquisition prices. This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of targets’ tax attributes on 
M&A by showing that targets’ tax shelter participation is negatively related to takeover premiums.  
Second, this study employs a new measure of tax aggressiveness to capture tax shelter 
participation. There are at least three distinct advantages of using our measure relative to using 
existing measures of tax aggressiveness. The first advantage of our non-sheltering measure is that 
the target’s non-sheltering status is the private knowledge of the target and is only observable to 
the acquirer prior to the announcement of the deal.5 This important feature fits nicely with the 
notion that acquirers have both the incentive and ability to ensure that the offer price is appropriate 
by assessing private information of the target’s tax planning, such as its tax sheltering history, 
through comprehensive due diligence.6 Further, the private nature of the information revealed 
prior to the acquisition allows the takeover premium to reflect this new information. Because the 
choice of tax aggressiveness proxies has important implications for the strength of inferences that 
can be made (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), we believe that, relative to existing tax aggressiveness 
proxies, our proxy allows us to draw significantly stronger inferences on the question of how 
acquirers price targets’ risks related to tax shelter participation. 
The second advantage of our non-sheltering measure is that it allows the research 
question to focus on tax plans that are at the most aggressive end of the tax avoidance 
continuum—tax sheltering. Moreover, although firms can use tax indemnity insurance to insure 
against penalties associated with disallowed tax positions in M&A, neither the target nor the 
                                                
4 Concurrent work by Martin et al. (2013), described in the following section, and Mescall and Klassen 
(2014) focus on broad proxies for tax aggressiveness and international transfer pricing risk, respectively. 
5 Hanlon (2003) and McGill and Outslay (2004) suggest that public data poorly informs outside investors on 
the specifics of firms’ tax plans. 
6 Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2013) study a different setting (debt contracting) where private information 
about tax planning activities is used. They find that more tax aggressive firms incur higher private bank debt 
costs—higher loan spreads and more stringent non-price loan terms—when obtaining bank loans. The results 
of Hasan et al. (2013) suggest that banks perceive aggressive tax planning as risk-engendering activities. 
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acquirer can purchase tax indemnity insurance against tax shelter participation. If tax shelter 
participation were insurable, we may not observe a significant association between targets’ non-
sheltering status and takeover premiums. Tax indemnity insurance can be underwritten for a wide 
range of federal, state, and foreign tax matters including complex issues such as transfer pricing. 
In terms of research design, the availability of tax insurance for other tax issues mitigates concerns 
that the identified premium effect is related to other forms of tax planning that may be employed 
by the target. Thus, if targets’ tax aggressiveness has any effect on takeover premiums, focusing 
on targets’ tax shelter participation would likely improve the power to detect such an effect.  
The third advantage of our non-sheltering measure is that it allows an empirical 
examination of the effect of targets’ use of a specific class of tax shelters, reportable transactions 
on takeover premiums, adding to the growing literature that examines specific tax transactions 
undertaken by firms (e.g., Brown 2011; Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 1999; Lisowsky 2010; 
Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock 2013).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and develops our two hypotheses. Section 3 proposes the research design and describes the sample 
selection. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents results of robustness checks and 
additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
Background on tax shelters 
Tax shelters cost the U.S. Treasury tens of billions of dollars in potential tax revenue between 
1993 and 2003 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). Recognizing the impact and 
proliferation of corporate tax shelters, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) have made an extraordinary effort over the last two decades to combat the use of tax 
shelters. Such efforts include extensive audits of tax shelter transactions; new tax shelter 
disclosure initiatives and regulations; and enforcement actions against tax shelter promoters such 
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as banks, law firms, and accounting firms.7 Recognizing that disclosure is an important 
mechanism to combat the growth of tax shelters, the IRS issued final Regulation Section 1.6011-4 
– Requirement of Statement Disclosing Participation in Certain Transactions by Taxpayers on 
February 28, 2003.  
Regulation Section 1.6011 requires taxpayers to disclose to the IRS their participation in 
“reportable transactions” on Form 8886 – Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement. This form 
is part of a firm’s tax return; it is not publicly available. Reportable transactions, as defined by the 
law, are transactions that the IRS considers potentially abusive.8 Currently, there are five major 
categories of reportable transactions: listed transactions, confidential transactions, transactions 
with contractual protection, loss transactions, and transactions of interest. Most of the tax shelters 
examined in recent literature (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 
2009) are listed transactions. Failure to disclose the use of reportable transactions to the IRS 
results in severe penalties. 
This study chooses reportable transactions to represent tax shelters because the use of 
these extreme forms of tax planning is not uncommon and the related tax savings can be very 
large. Using confidential reportable transaction disclosure data from the IRS Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis, Lisowsky et al. (2013) find that 338 firm-years, or 10 percent of their sample, involve at 
least one reportable transaction between 2006 and 2009.9 In terms of the economic significance of 
                                                
7 In 2005, KPMG admitted that it was involved in tax shelters that generated at least $11 billion in tax losses, 
costing the U.S. government at least $2.5 billion in revenue. KPMG’s actions resulted in a penalty of $456 
million and a criminal indictment of several former KPMG tax partners. In 2010, Deutsche Bank settled with 
the IRS for $554 million for fraudulent tax shelters that generated $29 billion in disallowed tax losses. In June 
2012, BDO reached a settlement with the IRS and paid a $50 million penalty for engaging in tax shelters that 
resulted in $1.3 billion of lost taxes. 
8 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6707A(e) requires taxpayers who file Form 10-K to disclose the 
imposition of penalties in Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) of Form 10-K. IRC Section 6707A(c) defines a 
reportable transaction as a type of transaction which the Secretary of the Treasury determines as having a 
potential for tax avoidance or evasion. Listed transactions, ones specifically identified by the Secretary 
include Lease in Lease Out, Sale in Lease Out, Fast Pay or Step-Down Preferred Transactions, and Contested 
Liability Acceleration Strategy. 
9 When Lisowsky et al. (2013) identify firms that have a reportable transaction in the year or in the prior two 
years, the number of firm-years satisfying this condition is 680, or 21 percent of the sample. 
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the tax savings, Boynton et al. (2011) report that the reportable transactions of 250 firms lowered 
their taxable income by $29.5 billion (2.8 percent) in 2006 and $21.4 billion (2.1 percent) in 2007. 
Lisowsky et al. (2013) also document that 48 firms used reportable transactions to reduce taxable 
income by a total of $10.7 billion (7.5 percent) in 2007. 
Hypothesis development 
In a negotiated takeover, the acquirer performs due diligence on the target and negotiates the price 
and terms of the acquisition before signing an acquisition agreement. During the due diligence 
period, the acquirer garners and verifies private information about the target, including the 
specifics of the target’s tax planning by assessing the target’s tax returns, working papers, and 
other related statutory filings. Participation in tax shelters would be revealed at this point. Our 
research question is posed to determine whether acquirers’ knowledge of a target’s non-
participation in tax shelters affects the level of takeover premiums offered to target shareholders. 
In this section, we review related literature and develop our hypotheses. 
Benefits and costs of tax planning  
Firms must trade-off current tax benefits, future tax costs and non-tax costs in deciding whether to 
participate in a particular tax structure or plan (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Shevlin 2014). To the firm, the benefits of avoiding taxes usually take the form of a lower ETR 
reported on the financial statements and/or an increased after-tax cash flow. These benefits do not 
come without costs. Direct costs of aggressive tax planning include costs of implementing tax 
plans such as in-house tax department salaries and external tax service fees (Mills et al. 1998). If 
the tax authority disallows the tax treatment, firms may incur additional taxes, penalties, and 
interest charges, and the firms’ financial statements may need to be restated (Graham et al. 2014). 
In addition to the direct costs, potential penalties, and the financial restatement risk, prior studies 
have documented a number of consequences of being aggressive for tax purposes, including closer 
scrutiny from the tax authority (Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000), potential reputational 
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damage (Graham et al. 2014; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009), deteriorated external information 
environment (Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Frank et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011), agency risk (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009), and higher private bank loan spreads and more restrictive non-
price (covenants and collateral) loan terms (Hasan et al. 2014).  
Consistent with these studies, the survey evidence presented in Graham et al. (2014) 
indicates that tax executives consider the lack of economic substance in tax transactions, 
reputational concerns, the possibility of IRS challenge, and the financial restatement risk to be 
important factors in their own firm’s decision not to implement aggressive tax plans marketed by 
accounting firms or investment banks.  
Investor valuation of tax planning 
Following Scholes and Wolfson’s (1992) framework, we assume that, on average, managers 
engage in the efficient tax planning using the optimal blend of tax planning strategies. Prior 
research on investor valuation of tax planning suggests that investors positively value aggressive 
tax planning only for firms with low managerial-diversion risk. For example, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) find a positive association between aggressive tax planning (abnormal book-
tax differences) and Tobin’s q for firms with strong corporate governance. Similarly, Wilson 
(2009) shows that tax shelter firms with strong governance earn positive abnormal returns during 
the period of active sheltering and the two years following. For firms with weak governance, these 
studies find no significant association between aggressive tax planning, and firm value or 
abnormal returns. Outside investors do not perceive a net benefit when managers’ aggressive tax 
planning is used to conceal rent-diverting activities such as earnings manipulation, insider trading, 
and bad news hoarding (Desai et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2011).10 Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and 
                                                
10 Consistent with this idea, Chen et al. (2010) show that family-owned firms engage in less aggressive tax 
planning, a result they attribute to family firms’ concerns over outside shareholders’ fears about wealth 
diversion. Blaylock (2011) examines whether tax avoidance is associated with managerial rent extraction 
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Larcker (2015) argue that agency problems may cause managers to engage in more or less tax 
avoidance than the shareholders prefer and suggest that governance mechanisms may be structured 
to align managers’ preference for tax avoidance with those of the shareholders. Armstrong et al. 
(2015) document evidence that suggests corporate governance mitigates both over- and under- 
investment in tax avoidance.  
 While firms have incentives to showcase the benefits derived from aggressive tax 
planning on their financial statements (Graham et al. 2014), firms also have strong incentives to 
reduce exposure to the negative consequences of aggressive tax planning by limiting disclosures to 
tax authorities and to the public. In the U.S., firms are not required to publicly disclose 
information about the specifics of their tax planning.11 Extant research finds that, on average, tax-
sheltering firms have larger book-tax differences (Lisowsky 2010; Wilson 2009), but they do not 
disclose their tax shelter participation in any publicly available sources. Therefore, outside 
investors infer the level of benefits of tax planning from firms’ financial statements, but the 
specifics of firms’ tax activities remain hidden (Hanlon 2003; McGill and Outslay 2004). In 
addition, firms that engage in aggressive tax planning may also be involved in aggressive financial 
reporting (Frank et al. 2009), making less transparent disclosures (Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013; 
Akamah, Hope, and Thomas 2014) and creating a more opaque external information environment 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2011). This increased opacity of the external information 
environment helps mask tax avoidance behavior, lowering the costs of tax avoidance (Akamah et 
al. 2014; Beck, Lin, and Ma 2014; Kerr 2013). Thus, tax shelters are typically characterized by 
secrecy and the firms’ adoption of tax shelters is unlikely to be detected by outsiders. 
                                                                                                                                 
with a focus on U.S. firms. He fails to find evidence that managers of U.S. firms extract rents through 
aggressive tax transactions. 
11 Financial statements do not reflect the firm’s tax status for reasons including accounting treatments 
(Hanlon and Shevlin 2002), tax and financial reporting incentives (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2004; 
Frank et al. 2009), and management judgment (De Simone, Robinson, and Stomberg 2014). One exception to 
the secret nature of firms’ tax shelter adoption is that some firms openly disclose their participation in 
Corporate-Owned Life Insurance (COLI) shelters (Brown 2011). Our M&A sample does not include firms 
that disclose the adoption of COLI shelters. 
11 
 
 Unlike outside investors, acquirers can obtain private information of the target’s tax 
planning through the due diligence process. Acquirers have strong incentives to know the details 
of the target’s tax positions when determining the offer price because the target’s potential tax 
liabilities are usually assumed by acquirers after M&A transactions. Therefore, we assert that, to 
acquirers, the private knowledge about the target’s tax sheltering (i.e., involvement in reportable or 
listed transactions) contains price-relevant information beyond that revealed in the target’s 
financial statements.12 Since the potential future costs of past tax shelters are expected to be 
significantly larger than those of other tax-motivated transactions, we argue that the private 
information about the target’s tax sheltering status would lead to a lower premium paid to a tax-
sheltering target relative to a non-sheltering target. Thus, stated formally in alternative form 
below, our first hypothesis predicts a positive effect of the targets’ non-sheltering status on 
takeover premiums:13 
 HYPOTHESIS 1. Targets’ non-sheltering status is positively associated with takeover 
premiums. 
Hypothesis 1 is not without tension for several reasons. First, evidence from extant 
research suggests that targets might have appropriately reserved for the potential future liabilities 
inherent in their tax shelter positions. For example, Gleason and Mills (2002) find that firms’ 
accruals for contingent tax liabilities reflect the amount and materiality of the expected loss. 
Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2010) report that, in their sample of 100 largest nonfinancial 
                                                
12 If the knowledge of the target’s tax shelter participation is made public prior to the deal, for example, via 
media mentions or tax court records (Graham and Tucker 2006; Brown 2011; Gallemore et al. 2014; Hanlon 
and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009), we expect that our measure of targets’ non-sheltering status will be less 
useful to acquirers. 
13 The first hypothesis is also consistent with Martin et al. (2013) who document a negative association 
between targets’ tax aggressiveness and takeover premiums. This study differs from Martin et al.’s (2013) in 
at least three dimensions: (1) our research design employs a unique tax aggressiveness proxy – the target’s 
non-sheltering status that is the private knowledge of the target and is only observable to the acquirer prior to 
the announcement of the deal, (2) with the new proxy, this study focuses on a specific yet extreme form of tax 
avoidance, IRS reportable transactions, and (3) our results highlight the important role that acquirers’ tax 
aggressiveness plays in the association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums, as 
described below. 
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and unregulated public firms covered by analysts, nearly as many firms had excess reserves (39 
percent) as had insufficient reserves (41percent) at FIN 48 adoption. Moreover, Lisowsky et al. 
(2013) show that the firms’ participation in reportable and listed transactions is, on average, 
adequately reflected on their tax reserves.14 Hence, to the extent that targets have properly 
reserved the potential future liabilities related to their tax shelters, we may not observe a 
significant effect of targets’ non-sheltering status on takeover premiums. 
 Second, contrary to the hypothesis, there may be a negative association if the tax shelter 
participation increases the firm’s valuation uncertainty. Prior research documents a negative 
association between targets’ financial information quality and takeover premiums, a result that is 
consistent with their prediction that acquirers overpay for targets that are characterized by high 
valuation uncertainty (McNichols and Stubben 2015; Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo2013; 
Skaife and Wangerin, 2013). Similarly, Stomberg (2013) shows that targets’ tax uncertainty, as 
measured by the coefficients of variation of tax rates, is positively associated with takeover 
premiums. To the extent that sheltering targets have higher information risk (Balakrishnan et al. 
2013; Desai et al. 2007; Frank et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011), and therefore are more difficult to 
value, acquirers will be more likely to overpay for sheltering targets. In this case, the observed 
association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums would be negative. This 
negative association, however, is less likely if sheltering targets are able to maintain a high quality 
internal information environment (Gallemore and Labro 2015). 
The role of acquirers’ tax aggressiveness 
The difficulty of post-merger cultural integration, or culture clash, is a major cause for deal failure 
(e.g., Weber and Camerer 2003; Van den Steen 2010). In an experimental setting, Weber and 
                                                
14 Lisowsky et al. (2013, p. 604) acknowledge the limitation to their findings that “we do not know the 
economic significance of uncertain tax positions reflected in the UTB that are not characterized as tax 
sheltering.” Thus, when drawing inferences from Lisowsky et al. (2013), we are cautious and acknowledge 
that we cannot rule out the possibility that tax shelter firms also engage in other uncertain, non-sheltering 
activities. 
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Camerer (2003) demonstrate that differences in culture between two laboratory firms lead to 
decreased post-merger performance for both of them. Prior studies also suggest that a firm’s 
aggressive tax planning is a feature of the firm’s corporate culture and leadership style. For 
example, Higgins, Omer, and Phillips (2014) find that a firm’s business strategy has significant 
influence on its tax aggressiveness, such that more innovative and risk seeking firms undertake 
more aggressive and less sustainable tax positions.15 Dyreng et al. (2010) track the movements of 
over 900 executives and show that there is a considerable variation in CEOs’ propensities to 
engage in aggressive tax planning. Because a firm’s corporate culture, in the sense of shared 
beliefs and values regarding the “right” behavior or action, can affect its policy choices for a broad 
range of business decisions (Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson 2009), we argue that more tax 
aggressive acquirers, relative to less tax aggressive acquirers, will be more accepting of targets’ 
participation in tax shelters. That is, more aggressive acquirers will not be willing to pay as high a 
premium for targets that abstain from tax shelters. Empirically, we expect to observe a less 
positive (or more negative) association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover 
premiums for acquirers that are more tax aggressive. Our second hypothesis is stated in alternative 
form as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover 
premiums is less positive for acquirers that are tax aggressive than for acquirers 
that are not tax aggressive. 
 Despite the theory of corporate integration, it is possible that the observed interaction of 
acquirers’ and targets’ tax aggressiveness is opposite to our expectation. Cai and Sevilir (2012) 
find that acquirers pay significantly lower takeover premiums for targets in transactions where the 
acquirer and target are connected via board ties. Previous studies on tax avoidance also show that 
                                                
15 Executives of tax aggressive acquirers are also more likely to be compensated to undertake aggressive tax 
planning and therefore may benefit from the targets’ tax shelter participation (Armstrong et al. 2012; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Gaertner 2014; Rego and Wilson 2012). 
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the adoption of tax shelters can spread across firms via network ties such as board interlock 
(Brown 2011) and that connected firms share similar tax profiles (Brown and Drake 2014). Our 
second hypothesis is motivated by less aggressive acquirers paying more for less aggressive 
targets. To the extent that this shared strategy reduces, rather than increases, the takeover 
premium, we will observe a finding opposite to our hypothesis. 
3. Research design 
Measure of targets’ non-participation in tax shelters 
We hand-collect the non-sheltering status information from each target’s Representations and 
Warranties in its Form 8-K. Examples of targets’ non-sheltering representation statements are 
shown in Appendix 1. The length and style of the statements vary slightly, but they are very 
consistent in terms of the content. In particular, all of the statements provide two pieces of 
important information: (i) the parties involved (the target firm only or both the acquirer and the 
target, including any subsidiaries), and (ii) the tax shelter transactions (reportable transactions, 
listed transactions, or both, with reference to the relevant regulation sections). The representation 
statements generally refer to non-participation in tax shelters for a target’s entire history up to the 
merger agreement signing date and do not contain forward-looking information regarding future 
tax shelter participation. Moreover, in some transactions, it is explicitly stated that neither the 
target nor the acquirer will participate or engage in any reportable or listed transaction pending the 
closing of the deal.16   
 We use a target’s representation concerning its non-participation in tax shelters as a 
measure of the target’s actual non-sheltering status. We discuss the validity of this assumption in 
the following section. Note that none of the targets in our sample state that they have participated 
in tax shelters in their representations. 
                                                
16 There are 11 targets (2.5 percent) claiming non-participation in tax shelters for a specified period of time 
(see Robbins & Myers Inc.’s representation in Appendix 1). Because of the small sample size, separate 
analysis is not feasible. However, eliminating the 11 targets from the analysis does not change the results.  
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Construct validity of the non-sheltering measure 
Whether the non-sheltering representation reliably captures the target’s underlying non-sheltering 
status depends on two conditions: (i) sheltering targets will not misrepresent themselves by 
claiming non-participation in tax shelters in their Form 8-Ks, and (ii) non-sheltering targets will 
not withhold this information from acquirers. Violation of either condition (i) or (ii) would 
contaminate our non-sheltering measure. This section discusses the validity of the two conditions. 
In support of condition (i), participants in a reportable transaction must disclose 
information for each reportable transaction on their tax returns. Therefore, it is easy for an acquirer 
to verify the target’s non-sheltering representation via due diligence prior to determining the 
takeover premium. Also, because of the complicated nature of reportable transactions, firms 
usually receive professional advice from tax shelter promoters and other tax advisors before 
participating in tax plans. So, it is expected that the target knows whether its tax plans constitute 
reportable transactions under the law. Equally important, because the Form 8-K is filed with the 
SEC, all information released on the Form 8-K will be subject to antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws. For these reasons, it is not likely that any sheltering targets will 
misrepresent themselves by claiming non-participation in tax shelters in their Form 8-Ks. Hence, 
condition (i) is likely to be satisfied. 
Condition (ii) holds if non-sheltering targets do not withhold information from acquirers. 
First, the non-sheltering representation is made in the Agreement and Plan of Merger under the 
target’s Representation and Warranties section. This section allows the acquirer to obtain 
information about the target before signing the merger agreement, and provides a basis for the 
acquirer to terminate the transaction after the merger agreement has been signed. Therefore, it is in 
the acquirer’s best interests to have the target state its non-sheltering status in the Representation 
and Warranties section to protect against subsequent risk of uncovering the target’s tax shelters 
after the merger agreement is signed. Second, from the target’s viewpoint, a non-sheltering target 
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would be willing to make a non-sheltering representation because doing so would likely facilitate 
the deal. Moreover, prior research suggests that non-sheltering targets have little incentive to 
withhold their non-sheltering status (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). Hence, condition (ii) is also 
likely to be satisfied. 
To empirically support the validity of the non-sheltering measure, in the following 
section, we compare our classification of sheltering and non-sheltering targets against measures of 
tax shelter use employed in prior research and examine correlations between our non-sheltering 
status measure and the existing measures of tax aggressiveness. 
Regression specifications 
To test our Hypothesis 1, we run the following regression model: 
PREM = α + β1 NONSHELTERtar +∑
k
βk CONTROLk + ε 
 (1) 
 
  
The dependent variable for (1), PREM, is the ratio of offer price to the target’s trading price one 
week or four weeks prior to the merger announcement date, minus one. The hypothesis focus on 
how the acquirer’s knowledge of the target’s tax shelter participation, informed through the M&A 
due diligence, affects the target’s value. Because the takeover premium represents the opinion 
difference between the target’s shareholders and the acquirer’s management over the target’s firm 
value, it is well suited to test the hypotheses. Other common measures, such as the acquisition 
announcement abnormal stock returns for the acquirer or the target, reflect the acquirer’s and 
target’s shareholders’ opinions, respectively, on the profitability of the deal and are less well 
suited to our research question. 
Our main independent variable, NONSHELTERtar is an indicator variable that equals one 
if a target’s non-sheltering representation is made in the merger agreement, and zero otherwise. A 
positive estimate of β1 in (1) would reject the null form of Hypothesis 1and suggest that targets’ 
non-sheltering status is associated with takeover premiums. Because of data requirements, all 
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deals are friendly takeovers. Control variables, as discussed below, are firm-specific and deal-
specific observable determinants of acquisition gains. 
Following the prior literature on M&A (e.g. Bradley et al. 1988; Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz 2004; Officer 2003), we control for a number of target, acquirer, and deal-level 
determinants of takeover premiums in (1). For targets’ and acquirers’ characteristics, we control 
for firm size (SIZE), Tobin’s q (TOBINSQ), profitability (ROA), and leverage (LEV). We also 
include the absolute value of targets’ discretionary accruals (DACCtar), estimated from the 
modified performance-matched cross-sectional Jones model of Kothari et al. (2005), to control for 
the potential effect of targets’ financial information quality on takeover premiums (McNichols and 
Stubben 2015; Raman et al. 2013; Skaife and Wangerin, 2013). To control for variation in the tax 
planning of the targets, we also include targets’ book-tax difference (BTDtar), net operating losses 
(NOLtar), income from foreign operations (FOREIGNtar), research and development expenditures 
(R&Dtar), and industry fixed effects. All firm-level characteristics are measured at the fiscal year 
end prior to the merger announcement.  
We include deal characteristics, including whether the merger agreement contains a 
termination fee payable by the target (TERMFEEtar) or the acquirer (TERMFEEacq); the fraction of 
the target’s common stock owned by the acquirer on the merger announcement date (TOEHOLD); 
the number of competing bidders (N_BIDDER); the relative deal size (DEALRATIO); and whether 
the deal is a tender offer (TENDER), a stock-financed transaction (ALLSTOCK),17 a within-
industry merger (INDMATCH), and a merger of high-technology firms (HIGHTECH). 
Finally, to address the concern that the targets’ non-sheltering representations incorporate 
disclosure incentives in addition to tax shelter use, we include controls for disclosure propensity. 
In particular, we include targets’ frequency of management forecast (FORECASTtar) and their bid-
                                                
17 The dummy variable ALLSTOCK indicates transactions that are 100 percent financed with stock and 
controls for the potential effect of tax-free acquisitions on takeover premiums (Ayers et al. 2003). The results 
remain unchanged when we use an alternative definition of ALLSTOCK (i.e., at least 80 percent of the 
consideration is stock-based.) 
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ask spread (SPREADtar) as additional controls for the firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior and 
information environment (Welker 1995), respectively. We also control for factors that may 
influence acquirers’ propensities to include targets’ non-sheltering representations in merger 
agreements. Gleason and Mills (2002) show that the likelihood of a tax deficiency disclosure 
increases as the materiality of the related IRS tax claims increases. In M&A, acquirers that are less 
aggressive in their own tax planning may be more concerned about targets’ potential use of tax 
shelters and thus prefer having targets’ non-sheltering representations in merger agreements. As 
such, we include the acquirer’s tax aggressiveness (BTDacq or PSHELTERacq) and litigation 
payouts (LITIGATIONacq) to control for the acquirer’s preference to include targets’ non-sheltering 
representations. We further control for the effect of the acquirer’s auditor choice (BIG4acq) because 
Louis (2005) finds that non-Big 4 auditors have a comparative advantage in assisting their client 
firms in M&A deals. Definitions of all variables are given in Appendix 2. 
To test our Hypothesis 2, we estimate the following regression model: 
PREM = α + β1 NONSHELTERtar + β2 TOP_TAX_AGGacq  
             + β3 NONSHELTERtar × TOP_TAX_AGGacq +∑
k
βk CONTROLk + ε 
 (2) 
 
  
TOP_TAX_AGGacq is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer is in the top quintile of 
the tax aggressive measures, and zero otherwise. Because our study focuses on tax sheltering, we 
use the acquirer’s total book-tax difference (BTD) as our main empirical measure of tax 
aggressiveness. Among the various measures of tax aggressiveness, total BTD is strongly 
correlated with tax shelter participation (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). In addition, Wilson (2009) 
develops a prediction model of tax shelter use that has been used to estimate the shelter probability 
(PSHELTER).18 We use the acquirer’s PSHELTER estimate as a second measure of tax 
                                                
18 Lisowsky et al. (2013) show that firms’ tax reserves or uncertain tax benefits (UTB) are useful in detecting 
tax shelter use. We choose not to use UTB to measure tax aggressiveness because the use of UTB data results 
in a significant reduction in sample size. For a similar reason, we choose not to use the tax shelter prediction 
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aggressiveness. Consistent with our directional prediction in Hypothesis 2, we expect β3 to be 
negative. 
Sample selection 
We draw the sample from the SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database and obtain all 
completed M&A transactions involving publicly traded U.S. target and acquiring firms announced 
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010.19 The sample is restricted to public firms 
because our research design requires both targets’ and acquirers’ financial statement data, which 
are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. To ensure that our sample only includes 
transactions that result in changes in control, we include only deals in which the acquirer owns less 
than 50 percent of the target’s shares prior to the merger announcement and more than 50 percent 
of the shares after the acquisition.20 We exclude transactions with deal values under $1 million. 
Table 1 presents details of the sample selection process. The initial sample begins with 
975 M&A transactions involving U.S. public acquirers and U.S. public targets listed on the SDC 
database for our sample period. We exclude 344 transactions that involve firms in the financial 
sector (SIC 6000-6999) because of the regulatory environment and data requirements. Because we 
hand-collect targets’ non-sheltering information from merger agreements included in the Form 8-
K filings, we further exclude 102 transactions that are hostile or unsolicited deals because these 
transactions do not have a merger agreement. After imposing the above restrictions and excluding 
observations with missing data in computing the dependent and control variables, our final sample 
contains 447 M&A deals. 
[Insert TABLE 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                 
model developed by Lisowsky (2010) because it imposes greater data requirements than the model by Wilson 
(2009). 
19 The sample period begins in 2005, shortly after the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
because very few targets make the non-sheltering representation in deals announced prior to 2005.  
20 In our final sample of 447 transactions, 433 acquirers own 100 percent of the target’s shares, 12 acquirers 
own between 80-97 percent of the target’s shares, and 2 acquirers own between 72-78 percent of the target’s 
shares after the deal. 
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Table 2 reports the percentage of sample transactions that contain a target’s non-
sheltering representation by announcement year. Of the 447 transactions in our sample, 341 
merger agreements (76 percent) contain a target’s non-sheltering representation, and the remaining 
106 merger agreements (24 percent) do not contain such a representation.21 The percentage of 
transactions with a non-sheltering representation increases significantly over the sample period 
from slightly less than 69 percent in 2005 to over 87 percent in 2010. We include year fixed 
effects to control for this trend.22 Across the sample, the mean difference in premium between the 
NONSHELTER subsamples differs by approximately 10 percent. While targets with the non-
shelter disclosure consistently demand a higher premium, the difference in average premium 
fluctuates from year to year, ranging a difference of just over 1 percent in 2005 to almost 20 
percent in 2010.23 
[Insert TABLE 2 here] 
4. Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on target, acquirer, and deal characteristics of the full sample, 
as well as mean and median comparisons between the subsamples of non-sheltering 
(NONSHELTERtar=1) and sheltering targets (NONSHELTERtar=0). For target characteristics, tests 
of the differences in means indicate that, relative to sheltering targets, non-sheltering targets report 
lower equity-method earnings, have more volatile stock returns, have larger book-tax differences, 
have higher UTB balances, and use more tax havens. These differences are consistent with the 
                                                
21 This proportion is similar to Lisowsky et al. (2013) when they determine firms’ involved in reportable 
transactions over a three-year period. The disclosures we observe are for firms’ involvement over their 
history. 
22 If we include a TREND variable, rather than, or in addition to, the year indicators, inferences are 
unchanged. We also note that any trend in acquisition premiums by targets not making the disclosure is much 
less evident, consistent with our hypothesized relation. 
23 Using the sample variance, a difference in excess of 3.1 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
(one-tailed test). All years except 2005 exceed this threshold. 
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characteristics of the samples of tax shelter firms employed in previous studies (e.g., Wilson 2009; 
Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013).  
[Insert TABLE 3 here] 
All acquirer characteristics are similar with the exception of the firm size. Firms that 
acquire a non-sheltering target tend to be larger than those that acquire a sheltering target. In terms 
of deal characteristics, deals involving a sheltering target are not likely to be tender offers and are 
usually large in relative deal size.  
Reported in Table 4 Panel A, the Pearson correlations show that NONSHELTERtar is 
negatively correlated with BTD, our primary tax aggressiveness measure, DD_BTD, the adjusted 
book-tax gap measure (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), and uncertain tax benefits (UTB). These 
results are consistent with prior research: among various empirical proxies of tax aggressiveness, 
BTD and UTB are better predictors of tax shelter use (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et 
al. 2013).24 Overall, results from univariate analysis support the assumption that targets that do 
not make a non-sheltering representation in merger agreements are more likely to be tax shelter 
firms than those who make such a representation. The correlation coefficients presented in Panel B 
of Table 4 are generally modest in size and do not reveal anything unexpected.  
[Insert TABLE 4 here] 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Table 5 presents estimation results of (1). In column (1) and (2), we present the results of 
regressing takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status with control variables. The 
coefficient estimate on NONSHELTERtar is 4.58 and significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed 
test), suggesting that targets’ non-sheltering status is associated with, on average, 4.6 percent 
                                                
24  Similar to the univariate results reported in Lisowsky (2010) and Lisowsky et al. (2013), our 
NONSHELTERtar measure is not highly correlated with ETR and Cash ETR. As discussed in Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010), firms use tax shelters when they cannot achieve their desired tax goals by other means. 
Thus, tax shelters may be associated with higher ETR, before the tax shelter is undertaken, but the ex-post 
correlation cannot be predicted. Thus, a low correlation is not a threat to the validity of our NONSHELTERtar 
measure. 
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higher takeover premiums.25 The results are qualitatively similar when takeover premiums are 
calculated using the target’s trading price one week (column (1)) or four weeks (column (2)) prior 
to the merger announcement date. The difference in takeover premium documented in these tests 
(4.58 percent) amounts to an increase in mean and median acquisition values of $70 million and 
$19 million, respectively. These estimates are reasonable given the aggressive nature of the type of 
tax planning (i.e., reportable or listed transactions). However, the magnitude of these results would 
not generalize to other forms of tax planning. 
[Insert TABLE 5 here] 
In addition, the results suggest that takeover premiums are significantly higher for targets 
with NOLs and higher R&D, larger acquirers, and deals that are larger in relative size or contain a 
target termination fee.26 They also suggest that takeover premiums are decreasing in the size of 
the target and its Tobin’s q, the target’s book-tax difference, the magnitude of the target’s foreign 
profits, and the acquirers’ toehold; and are lower for high-tech mergers. These results for the 
control variables are consistent with those documented in prior research (Betton and Eckbo 2000; 
Moeller et al. 2004; Officer 2003). With the target’s BTD included as a control variable, the 
positive effect of NONSHELTERtar on takeover premium suggests that targets’ non-sheltering 
status is value-relevant incremental to targets’ financial statement information on aggressive tax 
planning. 
To address the presence of extreme observations in the takeover premium measures, we 
estimate (1) using two alternative specifications. First, we re-estimate (1) using robust regression. 
                                                
25 The estimated premium we attribute to the targets’ non-sheltering status is reasonable in the context of the 
effects on premiums attributed to other tax and non-tax factors. For example, the tax shelters of the 24 sample 
firms in Graham and Tucker (2006) generated a median tax deduction of more than $1 billion per firm per 
year, or about 9 percent of total assets. Erickson and Wang (2007) estimate that, relative to acquisitions of 
similar C corporations, acquisitions of S corporations carry a tax-based purchase price premium of 12 to 17 
percent of deal value; Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012) document that M&A deals 
involving target lawsuits are associated with an increase in takeover premium of about 9 percent. 
26 The results are qualitatively similar if TERMFEE is defined as a percentage of the firm’s market value of 
equity. 
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Unlike OLS that assigns equal weight to all observations, robust regression weighs each 
observation differently depending on the behavior of the observation in the sample. The results of 
this approach are presented in column (3) and are consistent with the OLS results. Second, 3 
percent of the premium values in our sample are negative. Because zero should be an 
economically meaningful bound for takeover premiums (Officer 2003), we employ a Tobit 
specification with left censoring at zero to address the negative premium values. The results of the 
Tobit regression are also very similar. Finally, we control for the governance of the target and 
acquirer, in column (5), using the proportion of common equity owned by institutional holders. 
Inclusion of this variable reduces the sample size, but the coefficient on NONSHELTERtar yields 
similar inferences. 
Collectively, our results indicate that the association between targets’ non-sheltering 
status and takeover premiums is significantly positive, leading us to reject Hypothesis 1. The 
results suggest that acquirers pay lower takeover premiums to targets that have engaged in tax 
sheltering, consistent with acquirers being concerned about potential future liabilities related to the 
targets’ tax shelters. 
In table 6, we replace the BTD measure of the target with several alternative measures of 
tax aggressiveness. In column (2), we employ negative one times the targets’ five-year Cash ETR, 
negCETR5 as an alternative measure of tax aggressiveness (Dyreng et al. 2008). The coefficient 
on negCETR5 is negative and statistically different from zero, consistent with the BTD measure.27 
Both the main test and the coefficients on negCETR5 indicates that more aggressive targets 
receive lower takeover premiums, consistent with the basic premise of Hypothesis 1and the 
findings of Martin et al. (2013).  
[Insert TABLE 6 here] 
                                                
27 We also estimate this and subsequent models with Tobit and robust regressions. Consistent with the 
evidence from the regressions in Table 5, the results of these alternatives are qualitatively similar to the OLS 
results reported. 
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Potential endogeneity of targets’ non-sheltering representations 
We expect that the primary reason for targets giving non-sheltering representations is to facilitate 
the M&A transactions. However, the voluntary nature of including targets’ non-sheltering 
representations in merger agreements means that the propensity to include such representations 
may be related to other priced aspects of the deal or its parties, rather than the nature of the 
disclosure. Therefore, the relation between NONSHELTERtar and PREM may be endogenous and 
the observed higher takeover premiums may be due to other factors, particularly those related to 
disclosure choices. This section addresses the possibility that the observed positive association 
between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums is the result of the decision to 
include targets’ non-sheltering representations in merger agreements.28 
We first implement an instrumental variables procedure by using the probit model in (3) 
below as the first-stage regression: 
Pr(NONSHELTERtar =1) = Ф (α + β1 ROAtar + β2 BTDtar + β3 NOLtar+ β4 FOREIGNtar 
             + β5MEZZFINtar+ β6 EQEARNtar + β7 BIG4tar + β8 TREND + ε) 
  
 
(3) 
  
In choosing instruments for NONSHELTERtar, we seek variables that have been shown to 
correlate with aggressive forms of tax planning but not disclosure incentives, avoiding the many 
variables that are correlated with both (e.g., size, R&D, and litigation activity). Following Wilson 
(2009) and Lisowsky (2010), we include in (3) targets’ profitability (ROAtar), book-tax differences 
(BTDtar), net operating losses (NOLtar), income from foreign operation (FOREIGNtar), hybrid 
financing (MEZZFINtar), equity method earnings (EQEARNtar), the use of a Big 4 auditor 
(BIG4tar), and a time trend (TREND) to account for the year-to-year increase in the portion of 
sample disclosing non-participation in tax shelters over the sample period.  
Reported in column (1) of Table 7, the results of estimating (3) show that the targets’ 
non-participation in tax shelters is positively associated with profitability, and negatively 
                                                
28 This is not a traditional self-selection (or truncation) model in the spirit of Heckman (1979) because the 
outcome (whether the disclosure is made or not) is observed. 
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associated with BTD and inconsistent book-tax treatment (EQEARNtar). These results are 
consistent with those documented in prior research (Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013) and 
suggest that these firm-level characteristics are useful in identifying non-sheltering targets. The 
probit model is used to compute an instrumented proxy that is then included in (1). Because the 
potentially endogenous variable is categorical, we use three common methods to estimate the 
model, each differing in assumptions and estimation methods in the underlying model (Maddala 
1983; Cameron and Trivedi 2005, sec. 16.4; and Wooldridge 2010, sec. 18.4.1).29 The proxies for 
the targets’ propensity and opportunity to engage in tax planning, not included in (1) (MEZZFINtar, 
EQEARNtar, and BIG4tar) serve as exclusion restrictions in the estimation. While hybrid financing, 
the reporting of equity method earnings, and the engagement of Big 4 auditors are related to tax 
shelter use (Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013), these features are not associated with 
disclosure choices or takeover premiums, our dependent variable in the second stage.30  
[Insert TABLE 7 here] 
The results of the second-stage premium regressions are reported in columns (2) to (4) of 
Table 7. Column (2) reports the results of the endogenous treatment-effects regression using (3) as 
the first-stage regression. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the instrumental variable 
regressions using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator, respectively. In particular, after controlling for the potential endogeneity bias, 
we find that the coefficient estimates of NONSHELTERtar remain positive at p<0.05 in all three 
premium regressions. Additional tests of cross-equation correlation (rho) suggest that the null 
                                                
29 The empirical approach replaces the observed value of NONSHELTER with ones that control for the 
likelihood of a particular observation being a so-called treatment firm. The particular concern in our setting is 
that the treatment firm (i.e., NONSHELTER = 1) may be both the one that is not a shelter participant and the 
one that is willing to disclose that fact. The instruments focus the proxy on the first explanation and avoid the 
latter. 
30 These variables are in the OLS regression models earlier and the results suggest that they are not 
correlated with takeover premium (Tables 5 and 6), and so make valid excluded variables. 
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hypothesis of no correlation between the outcome errors and the treatment errors is not rejected, 
indicating no reliable evidence of endogeneity.31 
Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 present the results of estimating (2) using the acquirer’s BTD as 
the measure of its tax aggressiveness, and premiums calculated over one week and four weeks, 
respectively. Consistent with the results reported in Table 5, the main effect of NONSHLETERtar 
on takeover premiums is significantly positive. The coefficient on the interaction of 
NONSHELTERtar and TOP_BTDacq is negative at p<0.05, a result that is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. That is, the association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover 
premiums is less positive for acquirers that are more tax aggressive. In each case, the sum of the 
positive coefficient on the main effect of TOP_BTDacq, and the negative coefficient on the 
interaction is not statistically different from zero. This null result is consistent with very tax 
aggressive acquirers paying no additional premium for targets that do not use tax shelters, while a 
significant premium is paid by other acquirers. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) use 
PSHELTER as the tax aggressiveness measure. The coefficient on 
NONSHELTERtar×TOP_PSHELTERacq in these regressions is significantly negative at p<0.05.32  
[Insert TABLE 8 here] 
When we include the tax aggressiveness of the acquirer, and its interaction with 
NONSHELTERtar, the coefficient on the tax aggressiveness of the target continues to be negative 
in columns (1) and (2), where the proxy for tax aggressiveness is book-tax differences. The 
                                                
31 The conclusion is based on the result of likelihood-ratio test of independent equations (prob>𝜒! = 0.1735) 
using the maximum likelihood estimation of (1) and (3). Including R&D and LITIGATION do not alter these 
conclusions. 
32 As a robustness check, we replace the one-year tax aggressiveness proxies for BTD and PSHELTER with 
three-year average proxies calculated over the three years prior to the deal announcement year. The results 
(untabulated) are similar using the three-year average proxies. 
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coefficient on the target’s tax aggressiveness is not different from zero when the measure used is 
PSHELTER in columns (3) and (4), consistent with the main results.  
In sum, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 2. Acquirers that are very tax 
aggressive do not pay a premium for the targets’ non-participation in tax shelters. Taken together, 
the results of tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 are consistent with acquirers discounting the amount of 
premium paid for targets when acquirers are concerned about the potential future liabilities related 
to the targets’ tax shelter positions, and this price discount is observable only for less tax 
aggressive acquirers, whose managers are less accepting of tax sheltering and are more 
conservative regarding the potential future liabilities. 
5. Robustness checks and additional analyses 
Potential misclassification of the sheltering target sample 
We assume that targets that do not make a non-sheltering representation in merger agreements are 
tax shelter participants. However, because a target’s actual tax sheltering status is not observable, 
it is possible that our sample contains some non-sheltering targets that do not make the non-
sheltering representation in their merger agreements. Therefore, the presence of any non-sheltering 
targets in the “no-representation” group would contaminate our classification. Likewise, our 
classification is erroneous in the unlikely situations where sheltering targets misrepresent 
themselves by making the non-sheltering disclosure. In an attempt to mitigate the influence of the 
lack of disclosure on our results, we identify the observations that are most likely to be 
misclassified and exclude them from the estimation. Using the variables PSHELTER and 
NONSHELTER, we construct two subsamples: (i) we remove 37 non-disclosing targets in the 
bottom tercile of tax shelter probability, and (ii) we remove 55 disclosing targets in the top tercile 
of tax shelter probability. 
Results of tests of Hypotheses 1and 2 using the two subsamples are reported in Table 9. 
After the potentially misclassified observations are discarded from the sample, we find that the 
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coefficient on NONSHELTERtar and takeover premium remains significantly positive, and the 
coefficient on the interaction of NONSHELTERtar and the indicator for tax aggressive acquirers is 
negative. Results on the control variables are also similar to those reported previously. Thus, the 
potential presence of misclassified observations does not appear to have adversely affected our 
main result that targets’ non-sheltering status is associated with higher takeover premiums. 
[Insert TABLE 9 here] 
The role of targets’ tax reserves 
Our findings that acquirers pay higher takeover premiums for targets that disclose that they have 
not engaged in tax sheltering may imply that, at least from acquirers’ points of view, the 
contingent liabilities associated with the tax shelters have not been adequately reserved. If that is 
the case, we may observe a weaker association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover 
premiums when the related contingent liabilities are more adequately reserved. To examine this 
possibility, we include the natural logarithm of one plus each target’s UTB, our measure of the 
target’s tax reserve, and its interaction with NONSHELTERtar in (1). Results of this estimation 
(untabulated) indicate that neither the target’s UTB nor its interaction with NONSHELTERtar are 
related to takeover premium at the conventional level of statistical significance. The coefficient on 
NONSHELTERtar remains significantly positive.33 
Although we fail to document a significant coefficient on the interaction of the target’s 
UTB and non-sheltering status, we do not conclude that this coefficient is, in fact, zero. There are 
several potential reasons for the insignificant result. First, as the test results for Hypothesis 2 
indicate, an acquirer’s own preference for aggressive tax planning plays an important role in 
                                                
33 Mills, Robinson, and Sansing (2010) suggest that firms’ level of tax reserve may be affected by their 
strategic compliance decisions in the post-FIN 48 periods. As an additional test, we conduct an analysis 
around the adoption of FIN 48 by interacting the NONSHELTER variable with an indicator variable for years 
2007 to 2010. The untabulated results find that the coefficient on the interaction of this time-period indicator 
and our main variable is not statistically different from zero (coefficient of 3.86; t-statistic of 0.80). Finally, 
we include a de-meaned time trend variable and its interaction with NONSHELTER. The coefficients (t-
statistics) on the main effect of NONSHELTER and the interaction are 4.47 (1.76) and 2.34 (1.34), 
respectively. 
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determining the price discount levied on a tax-sheltering target. Thus, even if we assume that 
targets were able to establish unbiased UTB reserves for the contingent liabilities related to tax 
shelters, it is the acquirers’ judgment that matters, and they may or may not agree with the 
adequacy of the targets’ tax reserves. Second, the insignificant coefficient on the interaction may 
be because of a low-power test. Because of the missing data for targets’ UTB and the sample 
period of the study, the inclusion of targets’ UTB into the regression leads to a small sample size 
of 224 transactions. The small sample size, coupled with the high variation in the reliability of the 
UTB data, may contribute to the insignificant interaction effect. 
6. Conclusions  
This study examines the relation between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums. 
Specifically, using new data that identifies targets’ non-participation in tax shelters in a sample of 
447 transactions, we find that targets that disclose they have not used tax shelters have higher 
takeover premiums. We also show that this premium for targets’ non-participation in tax shelters is 
significantly stronger for acquirers that are less tax aggressive. 
 Extant research using long return windows has demonstrated that the most aggressive 
form of tax planning, the use of tax shelters, is either positively valued for well governed firms, or 
unrelated to value for poorly governed firms (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Wilson 2009). In short-
window tests, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) show a negative reaction to announcements of tax 
shelter participation, but Gallemore et al. (2014) show that such reaction is very short lived. By 
studying the premium an acquirer is willing to pay, considering past tax sheltering transactions of 
the target, we are the first to show a setting in which the relations are consistent with very 
aggressive tax planning having a negative effect on equity value. 
Our findings are subject to at least one limitation. In this study, we assume that targets 
that do not disclose their non-participation in tax shelters are sheltering targets. However, tax-
sheltering participation is not observable from publicly available data, making it impossible to 
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determine the amount of error in the classification (i.e., the number of non-sheltering targets not 
making a non-sheltering representation or the number of sheltering targets misrepresenting 
themselves). While we attempt to overcome this inherent limitation by controlling for disclosure 
choices and by eliminating potentially misclassified observations, we acknowledge that there is no 
way to ensure that every target in the no-representation group is a sheltering target. 
 
  
Appendix 1 
Examples of non-participation in tax shelters representation statements 
 JAMDAT Mobile Inc., December 8, 2005 
 “The Company and each Company Subsidiary have disclosed on their federal income Tax 
returns all material positions taken therein that could, if not so disclosed, give rise to a 
substantial understatement penalty within the meaning of Section 6662 of the Code. Neither 
the Company nor any Company Subsidiary has been a party to or participated in any way in a 
transaction that would be defined as a “reportable transaction” within the meaning of 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6011-4(b) (including, without limitation, any “listed 
transaction”) or any confidential corporate Tax shelter within the meaning of Treasury 
Regulation Section 1.6111-2.” 
 Electronic Data Systems Corp., May 13, 2008 
 “Neither the Company, nor any of its Subsidiaries has participated (i) in a transaction that is 
the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Internal 
Revenue Service has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and identified by notice, 
regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction, as set forth in Treasury 
Regulation § 1.6011-4(b)(1) or, (ii) to the Knowledge of the Company, in a reportable 
transaction (other than a listed transaction), as set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-
4(b).” 
 Varian Inc., July 26, 2009 
 “Neither the Company nor any Company Subsidiary has consummated, has participated in, or 
is currently participating in any transaction which was or is a “Tax shelter” transaction as 
defined in Sections 6662 or 6111 of the Code or the Treasury Regulations promulgated 
thereunder. Neither the Company nor any Company Subsidiary has participated in, nor are 
any of them currently participating in, a “Listed Transaction” or a “Reportable Transaction” 
within the meaning of Section 6707A(c) of the Code or Treasury Regulation Section 1.6011-
4(b), or any transaction requiring disclosure under a corresponding or similar provision of 
state, local, or foreign law.” 
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Robbins & Myers Inc., October 6, 2010 
 “For all Tax years and periods since January 1, 2006, neither R&M nor any R&M Subsidiary 
has participated in or been a party to a transaction that, as of the date of this Agreement, 
constitutes a “listed transaction” or “reportable transaction” within the meaning of 
Section 6011 of the Code and applicable Treasury Regulations thereunder (or a similar 
provision of state law).” 
  
 
 
Appendix 2 
Variable definitions and construction 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
 
NONSHELTER Indicator variable: 1 for transaction in which a target’s non-sheltering 
representation is made in the Agreement and Plan of Merger, and 0 
otherwise. 
  PREM [1-week] 
PREM [4-week] 
The ratio of offer price to the target’s trading price one week (four 
weeks) prior to the merger announcement date minus one; multiplied by 
100. This variable is collected from the SDC database. 
  
BTD 
 
Total book-tax difference: BTD = [(Pre-tax income – taxable income – 
state income taxes – other income taxes – equity in earnings) / lagged 
assets]  
where taxable income = {[(current federal tax expense + current foreign 
tax expense) – change in tax loss carry-forward] / 35%} 
Observations with negative taxable income are excluded. 
  
DD_BTD Discretionary total book-tax difference based on Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), where total book-tax difference is regressed on total accruals 
(with a firm-level fixed effect). Discretionary total book-tax difference 
is the residual value from the regression model. 
  
PSHELTER Probability of participation in tax shelters based on Wilson (2009):  
PSHELTER = exp(X’β) / [1+ exp(X’β)], where X’β  =  – 4.86 + 
5.20*BTD + 4.08*DACC – 1.41*LEV + 0.76*SIZE + 3.51*ROA + 
1.72*FOREIGN + 2.43*R&D 
  
UTB Natural logarithm of one plus the ending balance of the unrecognized 
tax benefits (UTB). This variable is hand-collected from the firms’ 10-K 
filings.  
  
negETR Tax expense divided by pre-tax book income. For the ease of 
interpretation across tax aggressiveness proxies, we multiply ETR by 
negative one so that greater values represent higher levels of tax 
aggressiveness. 
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negCETR5 Cash effective tax rate based on Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008): 
Cash tax paid over the previous five years divided by pre-tax income 
over the same period. This variable is truncated at [0, 1]. Observations 
with a negative denominator are excluded. For the ease of interpretation 
across tax aggressiveness proxies, we multiply CETR5 by negative one 
so that greater values represent higher levels of tax aggressiveness. 
  
TAXHAVEN 
(LN_TAXHAVEN) 
The (natural logarithms of one plus the) number of material subsidiaries 
location in a tax haven jurisdiction as reported in Exhibit 21 of the 
firm’s 10-K report. The data is provided by Scott Dyreng. 
  
TOP_BTD acq Indicator variable: 1 if the acquirer is in the top quintile of BTD, and 
zero otherwise. 
  
TOP_PSHELTER acq Indicator variable: 1 if the acquirer is in the top quintile of PSHELTER, 
and zero otherwise. 
  
SIZE Natural logarithm of one plus market value of equity. Market value of 
equity is calculated using number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the stock price. 
  TOBINSQ Market value of assets over book value of assets. Market value of assets 
equals to book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity, where market value of equity equals to number 
of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price. 
  
ROA Pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
LEV Total long-term debt, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
DACC Discretionary accruals in absolute value, estimated from the modified 
performance-matched cross-sectional Jones Model developed by 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Total accruals are measured as the 
change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities 
excluding the current portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation and 
amortization, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
NOL Indicator variable: 1 if the firm’s reported net operating loss carry-
forward is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
  
R&D Research and development expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. 
Missing values are coded as zero. 
  
LITIGATION Indicator variable: 1 if pretax or after-tax litigation/insurance settlement 
is negative, indicating a payout; 0 otherwise. 
  
FOREIGN Foreign pre-tax income, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
MEZZFIN Convertible debt and preferred stock, scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
EQEARN  Income reported under the equity method, scaled by lagged total assets. 
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BIG4 Indicator variable: 1 if the firm’s auditor is Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, or PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 0 otherwise. 
  
FORECAST  Natural logarithm of one plus the total number of management forecast 
in the fiscal year immediately prior to the merger announcement date. 
Missing values are coded as zero. 
  
SPREAD  Natural logarithm of one plus the average bid-ask spread of the firm, 
measured over the 12-month period before merger announcement. 
  
INST_OWN The ratio of the number of shares held by institutional investors to the 
total number of shares outstanding. 
  
TERMFEE tar Indicator variable: 1 if the merger agreement contains a termination fee 
payable by the target, and 0 otherwise. This variable is collected from 
the SDC database. 
  
TERMFEE acq Indicator variable: 1 if the merger agreement contains a termination fee 
payable by the acquirer, and 0 otherwise. This variable is collected from 
the SDC database. 
  
TOEHOLD The fraction of the target’s common stock owned by the acquirer on the 
merger announcement date. This variable is collected from the SDC 
database. 
  
N_BIDDER The number of competing bids for the target. This variable is collected 
from the SDC database. 
  
TENDER Indicator variable: 1 for tender offer, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
collected from the SDC database. 
  
ALLSTOCK Indicator variable: 1 for 100 percent stock-financed deal, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is collected from the SDC database. 
  
DEALRATIO The ratio of the total deal value to the acquirer's pre-announcement 
market value of equity; market value of equity is defined as the number 
of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 6th trading day 
prior to the merger announcement date. The total deal value is collected 
from the SDC database. 
  
INDMATCH Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target are within the same 2-digit 
SIC industry, and 0 otherwise. 
  
HIGHTECH Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target are both in a high-technology 
industry, and 0 otherwise. High-tech industries are as those in SIC codes 
2833-2836 (Pharmaceuticals), 3570-3577 (Computers), 3600-3674 
(Electronics), 7371-7379 (Programming), or 8731-8734 (R&D 
Services). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Data Restriction 
       
N 
 
 
Merger or Acquisition deals listed on the SDC database involving U.S. public acquirers 
and U.S. public targets announced between 2005 and 2010: 975 
  Less: 
  
Deals involving firms in the financial industries (SIC codes ranging from 6000 
to 6999): 
(344)
 
 
 
 Less: Deals without an Agreement and Plan of Merger  (102)
 
 
 Less: Deals with missing data (Compustat or CRSP)  (49)
 
 
 Less: Deals with missing data (SDC) (33)
  Final Sample 447
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TABLE 2 
Sample distribution by announcement year 
 
 
 
Year 
 
No. of 
Deals 
(Percent 
of 
Sample) 
NON-
SHELTER 
=1 
(Percent of 
Sample) 
[Percent of 
Year] 
Mean 
(Median) 
Acquirer  
Market Cap 
($mil) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Target  
Market Cap 
($mil) 
Mean  
(Median)  
PREM  
[1-week] 
NON-
SHELTER
=1 
Mean  
(Median)  
PREM  
[1-week] 
NON-
SHELTER
=0 
       
   
    
2005 86 59 30,850.9 1,828.9 34.24 32.85 
 
(19.2) 
 
(13.2) 
[68.6] 
(5,452.1) 
 
(344.8) 
 
(26.62) 
 
(31.79) 
 
   2006 88 63 22,877.7 1,910.6 33.46 23.89 
 
(19.7) 
 
(14.1) 
[71.6] 
(3,956.5) 
 
(561.7) 
 
(28.72) 
 
(20.97) 
 
   2007 94 66 19,348.7 967.7 29.98 25.67 
 
(21.0) 
 
(14.8) 
[70.2] 
(3,340.7) 
 
(528.0) 
 
(28.39) 
 
(20.70) 
 
   2008 55 45 26,159.4 1,143.5 48.12 34.41 
 
(12.3) 
 
(10.1) 
[81.8] 
(4,136.3) 
 
(294.5) 
 
(37.51) 
 
(32.77) 
 
   2009 51 44 31,849.9 2,717.9 48.61 43.87 
 
(11.4) 
 
(9.80) 
[86.3] 
(3,017.2) 
 
(302.4) 
 
(22.82) 
 
(41.50) 
 
   2010 73 64 25,849.9 877.3 53.49 33.65 
 
(16.3) 
 
(14.3) 
[87.7] 
(3,548.1) 
 
(289.7) 
 
(40.67) 
 
(31.13) 
 
       
Total 447 341 25,582.4 1,523.6 39.96 30.09 
 
(100.0) (76.3) (3,864.5) (414.4) (31.90) (22.97) 
        
Notes: 
The sample consists of 447 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 2005 and 2010. NONSHELTER 
is an indicator variable equals one if a target’s non-sheltering representation is made in the merger agreement, 
and zero otherwise. The mean value in bold represents significant difference between the two groups at the 
0.10 level (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Full Sample 
N=447 
 
NONSHELTER = 1 
N=341 
 
 
NONSHELTER = 0 
N=106 
 
p-Value 
(Mean 
Diff.) 
 Mean Media
n 
Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Media
n 
Std.Dev.  
   
  
    
  
Target Traits 
  
  
    
 
SIZE tar 
5.784 
 5.988 1.873  5.717  5.991 1.803  5.932  5.681 2.086 0.77 
TOBINSQ tar  
2.129 
 1.774 1.270  2.154  1.778 1.297  2.047  1.742 1.180 0.45 
ROA tar  
0.036 
 0.096 0.238  0.037  0.094 0.241  0.034  0.103 0.229 0.92 
LEV tar  
0.179 
 0.049 0.297  0.173  0.045 0.288  0.201  0.103 0.325 0.40 
DACC tar  
0.017 
 0.005 0.437  0.021  0.009 0.492  0.003  0.003 0.168 0.64 
TERMFEE tar  
0.863 
 1.000 0.343  0.859  1.000 0.348  0.877  1.000 0.329 0.59 
NOL tar  
0.494 
 0.000 0.500  0.501  1.000 0.501  0.471  0.000 0.501 0.59 
R&D tar  
0.116 
 0.055 0.225  0.112  0.062 0.169  0.125  0.032 0.351 0.60 
LITIGATION tar  
0.085 
 0.000 0.279  0.094  0.000 0.292  0.566  0.000 0.232 0.23 
FOREIGN tar  
0.004 
 0.000 0.089  0.003  0.000 0.101  0.008  0.000 0.034 0.58 
MEZZFIN tar  
0.051 
 0.000 0.154  0.052  0.000 0.158  0.047  0.000 0.138 0.79 
EQEARN tar  
0.002 
 0.000 0.015  0.001  0.000 0.005  0.004  0.000 0.029 0.02 
BIG4 tar  
0.779 
 1.000 0.416  0.780  1.000 0.415  0.774  1.000 0.420 0.89 
VOLAT tar  
0.121 
 0.108 0.083  0.126  0.111 0.085  0.104  0.097 0.076 0.02 
SPREAD tar −3.17
1 
−3.401 1.520 −3.187 −3.426 1.408 −3.119 −3.329 1.841 0.69 
BTD tar  
0.012 
 0.000 0.088  0.006  0.000 0.082  0.028  0.000 0.103 0.03 
DD_BTD tar  
0.004 
−0.001 0.079 −0.001 −0.002 0.073  0.021 −0.015 0.094 0.03 
PSHELTER tar  
0.589 
 0.632 0.292  0.571  0.687 0.328  0.587  0.675 0.307 0.63 
UTB tar   
3.994 
 0.000 4.456  4.214  3.466 4.460  2.845  0.000 4.316 0.09 
negETR tar −0.27
2 
−0.324 0.185 −0.276 −0.324 0.194 −0.259 −0.323 0.157 0.50 
negCETR5 tar −0.26
9 
−0.243 0.234 −0.273 −0.252 0.235 −0.258 −0.240 0.235 0.70 
TAXHAVEN tar  
0.663 
 0.693 0.692  0.688  1.000 0.475  0.582  1.000 0.500 0.17 
LN_TAXHAVEN tar  
0.741 
 0.693 0.695  0.782  0.693 0.705  0.601  0.693 0.649 0.08 
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Acquirer Traits           
SIZE acq 8.437 8.259 2.073 8.601 8.385 2.003 7.911 7.707 2.212 0.01 
TOBINSQ acq 2.111 1.771 1.138 2.095 1.769 1.152 2.178 1.863 1.094 0.51 
ROA acq 0.099 0.095 0.126 0.097 0.093 0.119 0.099 0.103 0.145 0.96 
LEV acq 0.197 0.177 0.173 0.191 0.174 0.168 0.218 0.184 0.187 0.15 
TERMFEE acq 0.212 0.000 0.409 0.202 0.000 0.402 0.245 0.000 0.432 0.35 
TOEHOLD acq 0.734 0.000 6.207 0.554 0.000 5.679 1.313 0.000 7.668 0.27 
BTD acq 0.031 0.010 0.063 0.029 0.006 0.065 0.038 0.016 0.057 0.20 
BIG4 acq 0.928 1.000 0.258 0.947 1.000 0.224 0.868 1.000 0.340 0.01 
LITIGATION acq 0.159 0.000 0.366 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.122 0.000 0.329 0.24 
           
Deal Traits           
N_BIDDER 1.049 1.000 0.236 1.047 1.000 0.225 1.057 1.000 0.270 0.71 
TENDER 0.212 0.000 0.409 0.231 0.000 0.422 0.151 0.000 0.360 0.08 
ALLSTOCK 0.123 0.000 0.329 0.112 0.000 0.315 0.160 0.000 0.369 0.18 
DEALRATIO 0.249 0.092 0.314 0.234 0.077 0.311 0.301 0.167 0.320 0.05 
INDMATCH 0.637 1.000 0.481 0.631 1.000 0.483 0.660 1.000 0.476 0.58 
HIGHTECH 0.407 0.000 0.492 0.425 0.000 0.495 0.349 0.000 0.479 0.16 
           
Premiums (%)           
PREM [1-week] 37.61 30.64 33.66 39.96 31.90 34.64 30.09 22.97 29.24 0.01 
PREM [4-week] 41.59 32.97 38.14 44.34 34.55 40.59 32.73 26.65 27.21 0.01 
           
 
Notes: 
This table reports summary statistics of the sample. The mean value in bold represents significant difference between the two groups at the 0.10 level (two-
tailed). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. The sample size for UTB is 224 observations. 
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TABLE 4 
Panel A: Correlations among tax aggressiveness measures for target firms 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 (1) 
 
NONSHELTER 
  (2)
 
BTD 
 
−0.105 
(0.03) 
       
(3)
 
DD_BTD 
 
− 117 
(0.03) 
0.674 
(0.00) 
      
(4)
 
PSHELTER 
 
 23 
(0.63) 
0.236 
(0.00) 
 0.219 
(0.00) 
     
(5)
 
UTB 
 
− 125 
(0.06) 
0.086 
(0.20) 
 1 7 
(0.17) 
−0.073 
(0.27) 
    
(6)
 
negETR 
 
− 40 
(0.50) 
0.112 
(0.06) 
 346 
(0.00) 
− 148 
(0.01) 
 0.138 
(0.12) 
   
(7)
 
negCETR5 
 
− 028 
(0.70) 
0.157 
(0.03) 
 245 
(0.00) 
 180 
(0.01) 
− 261 
(0.00) 
 0.005 
(0.95) 
  
(8)
 
TAXHAVEN 
 
 086 
(0.17) 
0.010 
(0.55) 
− 45 
(0.48) 
 244 
(0.00) 
 1 1 
(0.25) 
− 066 
(0.38) 
−0.069 
(0.43) 
 
(9)
 
LN_TAXHAVEN 
 
 09 
(0.08) 
− 006 
(0.92) 
− 027 
(0.67) 
 366 
(0.00) 
 125 
(0.15) 
− 020 
(0.80) 
− 079 
(0.36) 
0.806 
(0.00) 
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Panel B: 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) PREM [1-week]                  
(2) NONSHELTER tar 0.14                 
(3) SIZE tar −0.28 0.01                
(4) TOBINSQ tar −0.08 0.04 0.08               
(5) ROA tar −0.19 0.00 0.38 −0.27              
(6) LEV tar 0.04 −0.04 0.15 −0.06 −0.04             
(7) DACC tar 0.09 0.12 −0.11 0.05 −0.13 −0.09            
(8) TERMFEE tar 0.08 −0.02 −0.05 0.04 −0.05 −0.01 0.01           
(9) BTD tar −0.20 −0.11 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.04 −0.04 0.01          
(10) NOL tar 0.16 0.03 −0.16 0.02 −0.12 −0.07 0.02 −0.01 −0.03         
(11) FOREIGN tar −0.14 −0.03 0.15 −0.01 0.22 0.01 −0.12 −0.02 0.06 0.04        
(12) R&D tar 0.24 −0.02 −0.20 0.31 −0.45 0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.07 0.16 −0.13       
(13) LITIGATION tar −0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 −0.01 0.04 −0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.02      
(14) MEZZFIN 0.09 0.01 −0.04 0.08 −0.14 0.40 −0.02 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04     
(15) EQEARN −0.09 −0.08 0.26 −0.09 0.13 0.12 −0.04 −0.02 −0.04 −0.15 0.06 −0.14 0.00 0.00    
(16) BIG4 −0.06 0.01 0.41 0.02 0.05 0.07 −0.05 0.02 −0.04 −0.04 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.12   
(17) FORECAST −0.05 −0.03 0.18 0.02 0.12 −0.10 −0.05 0.03 −0.01 −0.05 0.07 −0.05 −0.01 −0.06 0.01 0.13  
(18) SPREAD 0.06 −0.02 −0.31 0.05 −0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.26 −0.20 
                  
 
Notes: 
This table presents Pearson correlations among tax aggressiveness measures for target firms. Reported in parentheses are p-values. The coefficients in bold are 
all statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2.
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TABLE 5 
The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Expected Sign 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[4-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
       
  OLS OLS Robust Tobit OLS 
 
 
   
  
 NONSHELTER tar +   4.581** 5.902** 4.675** 4.827** 4.928** 
 
 (1.849) (1.825) (1.951) (1.868) (1.912) 
Target Traits 
    
  
 SIZE tar    −5.376*** −9.855*** −5.863*** −5.395*** −5.461*** 
      (−5.197) (−5.469) (−5.942) (−5.294) (−4.636) 
 TOBINSQ tar  −2.814*** 0.354 −2.800*** −3.500*** −1.766* 
  (−3.008) (0.247) (−2.912) (−3.554) (−1.672) 
 ROA tar  9.193 11.610 11.074 2.836 9.941 
  (1.067) (0.912) (1.262) (0.488) (0.898) 
 LEV tar  3.440 13.258 2.835 −2.960 3.468 
  (0.642) (1.097) (0.570) (−0.687) (0.526) 
 DACC tar  2.708 6.626* 3.108 3.176 2.053 
  (0.902) (1.656) (1.022) (1.119) (0.722) 
 TERMFEE tar  4.484 7.458 5.677* 4.912 6.258** 
  (1.522) (1.593) (1.921) (1.540) (2.181) 
 BTD tar  −39.020*** −31.670 −39.070*** −36.400*** −36.840** 
  (−2.611) (−1.603) (−2.663) (−2.871) (−2.401) 
 NOL tar  5.930*** 8.239** 6.188*** 4.820** 6.480*** 
  (2.789) (2.478) (2.978) (2.206) (2.944) 
 R&D tar  19.840*** 24.800** 20.580*** 21.820*** 17.154 
  (4.095) (2.512) (4.409) (3.726) (1.491) 
 LITIGATION tar  −1.823 −7.855 −1.104 −4.246 −2.298 
  (−0.372) (−1.367) (−0.228) (−1.107) (−0.498) 
 FOREIGN tar  −23.460*** −6.026 −22.490*** −20.380* −23.050*** 
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  (−3.225) (−0.628) (−2.973) (−1.665) (−3.019) 
 MEZZFIN tar  12.710 16.630 10.540 17.230 −5.307 
  (1.199) (0.936) (1.047) (1.455) (−0.442) 
 EQEARN tar  0.858 −1.197 −0.187 0.516 0.771 
  (0.242) (−0.321) (−0.055) (0.134) (0.220) 
 BIG4 tar  1.910 2.003 1.264 2.918 4.218 
  (0.637) (0.429) (0.428) (0.984) (1.466) 
 FORECAST tar  0.325 −0.637 0.172 −0.020 0.027 
  (0.252) (−0.372) (0.137) (−0.014) (0.021) 
 SPREAD tar  −0.357 0.217 −0.421 −0.781 −1.203 
  (−0.405) (0.182) (−0.479) (−1.018) (−1.192) 
 INST_OWN tar      1.469 
      (0.437) 
Acquirer Traits       
 SIZE acq  3.375*** 6.467*** 3.469*** 3.358*** 3.674*** 
  (3.594) (4.326) (3.862) (3.990) (3.854) 
 TOBINSQ acq  −0.289 −2.096 −0.290 0.250 −0.931 
  (−0.276) (−1.146) (−0.276) (0.229) (−0.840) 
 ROA acq  −4.786 12.440 −7.891 −6.880 −1.788 
  (−0.416) (0.629) (−0.683) (−0.681) (−0.175) 
 LEV acq  0.764 2.859 3.666 9.453 4.319 
  (0.101) (0.257) (0.486) (1.310) (0.579) 
 TERMFEE acq  −4.557 −3.906 −3.791 −2.886 −3.446 
  (−1.473) (−0.889) (−1.259) (−0.989) (−1.081) 
 TOEHOLD acq  −0.329** −0.281 −0.352* −0.287 −0.248 
  (−2.111) (−1.587) (−1.727) (−1.548) (−1.602) 
 BTD acq  1.833 −21.554 7.150 10.776 1.986 
  (0.098) (−0.818) (0.386) (0.585) (0.113) 
 LITIGATION acq  2.460 11.430** 3.054 3.707 1.657 
  (0.818) (2.270) (1.042) (1.234) (0.565) 
 BIG4 acq  −5.718 −2.405 −4.790 −7.634 −5.789 
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Notes: 
This table reports regression results of takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. Column (1) computes 
the takeover premium using market prices one week prior to the announcement whereas column (2) uses prices four weeks prior to the announcement. Column 
(3) re-estimates the equation using robust regression. Column (4) re-estimates the equation censoring the lower tail at zero and using Tobit estimates; Column 
  (−1.118) (−0.283) (−0.920) (−1.572) (−0.996) 
 INST_OWN acq      −5.717 
      (−0.788) 
Deal Traits       
 N_BIDDER  −4.110 8.009 −1.678 −0.558 −3.129 
  (−1.009) (0.781) (−0.436) (−0.124) (−0.837) 
 TENDER  4.011 10.590** 5.078* 5.780** 4.437 
  (1.475) (2.190) (1.865) (2.067) (1.575) 
 ALLSTOCK  −2.720 −1.257 −3.070 −3.786 −3.632 
  (−0.855) (−0.273) (−0.935) (−1.056) (−1.058) 
 DEALRATIO  5.055*** 10.010*** 4.276*** 4.164*** 4.853*** 
  (4.369) (4.452) (3.642) (2.600) (4.269) 
 INDMATCH  2.130 2.668 2.781 2.160 3.153 
  (0.850) (0.736) (1.111) (0.894) (1.301) 
 HIGHTECH  −7.469** −10.510*** −8.165** −9.377*** −8.793** 
  (−2.192) (−2.648) (−2.478) (−3.411) (−2.567) 
Intercept  39.800*** 14.820 35.740*** 34.850*** 31.110*** 
  (3.768) (0.772) (3.563) (3.972) (2.913) 
       
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2  0.34 0.30  0.35 0.368 
 Pseudo R2    0.45   
     N  447 447 447 447 409 
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(4) reports OLS results with corporate governance of acquirers and targets as additional control variables. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed 
using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; *, **, *** represent statistical significance levels (two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for 
NONSHELTER tar) of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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TABLE 6 
The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
     
 TAX_AGG tar  PSHELTER negCETR5 UTB 
 
 
    NONSHELTER tar + 4.823** 5.762** 8.656** 
 
 (1.961) (2.026) (1.971) 
Target Traits  
    SIZE tar  −4.314*** −7.135*** −7.382*** 
 
 (−2.815) (−5.669) (−3.656) 
 TOBINSQ tar  −2.884*** −1.192 −3.181** 
  (−3.080) (−0.666) (−2.359) 
 ROA tar  10.460 13.679 17.910* 
  (1.037) (0.596) (1.812) 
 LEV tar  2.710 15.340*** 8.981 
 
 (0.524) (2.934) (1.096) 
 DACC tar  2.796 4.305** −0.005 
 
 (0.912) (2.044) (−0.002) 
 TERMFEE tar  5.115* 5.778* 5.470 
  (1.727) (1.791) (1.152) 
 TAX_AGG tar  −10.890 −27.200*** 0.173 
  (−1.183) (−3.478) (0.335) 
 NOL tar  5.424** 1.380 7.894** 
  (2.450) (0.475) (2.417) 
 R&D tar  18.060*** 14.440 20.410*** 
  (3.829) (0.395) (4.555) 
 LITIGATION tar  −2.207 42.120 −4.005 
  (−0.448) (1.237) (−0.710) 
 FOREIGN tar  −21.840*** 2.303 −29.440*** 
  (−2.828) (0.417) (−4.019) 
 MEZZFIN tar  10.420 −36.450** 8.949 
  (0.998) (−2.194) (0.497) 
 EQEARN tar  2.360 1.467 4.696 
  (0.642) (0.379) (0.690) 
 BIG4 tar  3.818 −3.650 3.511 
  (1.266) (−0.859) (0.839) 
 FORECAST tar  1.051 −0.662 0.347 
  (0.799) (−0.423) (0.160) 
 SPREAD tar  −0.493 −2.280* 1.325 
  (−0.558) (−1.700) (0.764) 
Acquirer Traits     
 SIZE acq  2.982** 3.786*** 4.761*** 
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Notes: 
This table reports regression results of takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status, controlling for 
other proxies of targets’ tax aggressiveness. For results presented from column (1) to column (3), TAX_AGG 
tar is targets’ estimated tax shelter probability, negative 1 times the five-year cash ETR, and natural logarithm 
 
 (2.523) (3.144) (2.724) 
 TOBINSQ acq  0.128 −0.184 −1.952 
  (0.124) (−0.100) (−0.965) 
 ROA acq  −4.640 8.856 9.969 
  (−0.367) (0.570) (0.620) 
 LEV acq  2.317 4.431 2.868 
 
 (0.294) (0.589) (0.259) 
 TERMFEE acq  −5.039 −0.034 −4.907 
  (−1.642) (−0.011) (−1.089) 
 TOEHOLD acq  −0.328** −0.420*** −0.273 
  (−2.007) (−3.298) (−1.395) 
 TAX_AGG acq  1.231 3.333 −0.189 
  (0.088) (0.341) (−0.283) 
 LITIGATION acq  2.407 3.832 −2.122 
  (0.795) (1.071) (−0.545) 
 BIG4 acq  −5.635 2.466 −16.470** 
  (−1.050) (0.373) (−2.056) 
Deal Traits     
 N_BIDDER  −3.036 −1.732 −10.530* 
  (−0.746) (−0.274) (−1.680) 
 TENDER  3.383 −0.416 1.530 
 
 (1.139) (−0.116) (0.405) 
 ALLSTOCK  −3.671 −7.574* −11.850** 
 
 (−1.104) (−1.672) (−2.427) 
 DEALRATIO  4.952*** 4.729*** 5.491 
 
 (4.193) (4.200) (0.880) 
 INDMATCH  1.354 −1.927 0.852 
 
 (0.537) (−0.684) (0.227) 
 HIGHTECH  −6.673* −2.118 0.470 
 
 (−1.933) (−0.494) (0.092) 
Intercept  43.730*** 28.490** 61.560*** 
  (3.872) (2.111) (4.128) 
     
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2  0.34 0.46 0.45 
     N  447 227 224 
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of one plus ending UTB balance, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. Reported in 
parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance levels (two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for NONSHELTER tar) of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums: instrumental 
variables two-stage regressions 
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
   
 
NONSHELTER 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week]  
     
 
 NONSHELTER tar 
 
16.640** 4.641** 9.439**  
(Expected Sign: +) 
 
(1.919) (1.997) (1.726)  
      
Target Traits 
 
    
 SIZE tar  −4.585*** −4.947*** −4.781***  
 
 (−5.481) (−7.072) (−5.796)  
 TOBINSQ tar  −2.542*** −2.928*** −2.648***  
  (−2.626) (−4.318) (−2.703)  
 ROA tar 0.536* 4.551 −0.010 6.678  
 (1.647) (0.803) (−0.002) (1.186)  
 LEV tar  5.241 5.078 4.616  
 
 (1.335) (1.451) (1.234)  
 DACC tar  4.212 2.457 3.038  
 
 (1.488) (1.100) (1.062)  
 TERMFEE tar  6.200** 5.818*** 6.291**  
  (2.002) (3.048) (2.012)  
 BTD tar −2.523*** −39.760*** −30.600*** −42.18***  
 (−2.639) (−3.043) (−3.126) (−3.385)  
 NOL tar −0.007 5.448** 5.468*** 6.403***  
 (−0.049) (2.490) (3.534) (2.939)  
 R&D tar  23.790*** 22.870*** 25.930***  
  (4.236) (7.952) (4.650)  
 LITIGATION tar  −1.149 −1.357 −1.774  
  (−0.310) (−0.415) (−0.473)  
 FOREIGN tar 0.763 −22.670* −21.620*** −20.170*  
 (1.023) (−1.923) (−4.616) (−1.676)  
 MEZZFIN tar 0.513     
 (1.306)     
 EQEARN tar −16.760*     
 
(−1.941)     
 BIG4 tar 0.097     
 
(0.552)     
 FORECAST tar  0.152 1.146 0.119  
  (0.107) (1.296) (0.083)  
 SPREAD tar  −1.186 −0.748 −1.047  
  (−1.528) (−1.175) (−1.347)  
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Acquirer Traits 
 
    
 SIZE acq  3.223*** 3.376*** 3.274***  
 
 (4.019) (4.661) (3.989)  
 TOBINSQ acq  0.147 −0.407 −0.233  
  (0.141) (−0.481) (−0.221)  
 ROA acq  −6.474 −4.473 −5.991  
  (−0.684) (−0.559) (−0.627)  
 LEV acq  1.303 5.870 0.374  
 
 (0.181) (1.116) (0.053)  
 TERMFEE acq  −4.758* −4.626** −3.819  
  (−1.695) (−2.531) (−1.368)  
 TOEHOLD acq  −0.311* −0.240** −0.303*  
  (−1.754) (−2.323) (−1.679)  
 BTD acq  3.206 22.810* 8.409  
  (0.179) (1.897) (0.462)  
 LITIGATION acq  3.092 5.346*** 3.544  
  (1.071) (2.670) (1.222)  
 BIG4 acq  −6.183 −3.627 −6.354  
  (−1.338) (−1.250) (−1.353)  
Deal Traits  
   
 
 N_BIDDER  −2.588 −6.719** −2.714  
  (−0.596) (−2.283) (−0.614)  
 TENDER  3.698 3.472* 3.906  
 
 (1.340) (1.699) (1.388)  
 ALLSTOCK  −2.051 −3.149 −2.296  
 
 (−0.590) (−1.610) (−0.671)  
 DEALRATIO  4.765*** 4.508*** 4.221***  
 
 (3.072) (4.629) (2.737)  
 INDMATCH  2.002 1.149 1.114  
 
 (0.810) (0.665) (0.489)  
 HIGHTECH  −7.921** −6.219*** −8.936***  
 
 (−2.572) (−3.238) (−3.873)  
 TREND 0.175***     
 (4.017)     
Intercept 0.713 40.240*** 32.280*** 28.870***  
 (0.941) (3.096) (4.530) (3.221)  
      
Year Fixed Effects  NO YES YES YES  
Target Industry Fixed Effects                 
YES YES YES YES  
Cross-equation correlation (rho)  −0.32   
 
 
 Adjusted R2 
 
 0.301 0.293  
 Pseudo R2 0.122     
 Area under ROC 0.73     
     N 447 447 447 447  
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Notes: 
This table reports regression results of takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status.  Column (1) 
reports the results of probit estimation of Equation (3). Column (2) reports the results of the endogenous 
treatment regression using Equation (3) as the first-stage regression. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of 
the instrumental variable regressions using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimator, respectively; both using Equation (3) as the first-stage regression. Variable 
definitions are given in Appendix 2. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; *, **, *** represent statistical significance levels (two-tailed for 
control variables and one-tailed for NONSHELTER tar) of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums: the role of 
acquirers’ tax aggressiveness 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[4-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[4-week] 
   
   
 NONSHELTER tar + 7.017*** 5.748** 6.089*** 4.625** 
 
 (2.426) (2.002) (2.557) (1.695) 
 NONSHELTER tar ×   – −9.756** −11.59***   
 TOP_BTD acq  (−1.800) (−2.391)   
      
 NONSHELTER tar ×   –   −18.270** −21.290** 
 TOP_PSHELTER acq    (−1.730) (−1.814) 
      
Target Traits 
 
    
 SIZE tar  −5.325*** −6.269*** −4.292*** −5.926*** 
 
 (−5.227) (−4.956) (−3.004) (−3.425) 
 TOBINSQ tar  −2.561*** −0.564 −2.810*** −0.349 
  (−2.817) (−0.478) (−2.642) (−0.289) 
 ROA tar  7.320 5.619 9.978 9.019 
  (0.827) (0.534) (0.965) (0.665) 
 LEV tar  3.451 4.322 3.030 5.903 
 
 (0.645) (0.720) (0.622) (0.987) 
 DACC tar  1.956 3.660 2.748 4.203 
 
 (0.662) (1.143) (0.894) (1.282) 
 TERMFEE tar  5.680* 6.297* 5.055* 4.466 
  (1.930) (1.879) (1.751) (1.351) 
 BTD tar  −35.620** −26.810*   
  (−2.516) (−1.737)   
 PSHELTER tar    −10.920 −5.264 
    (−1.236) (−0.438) 
 NOL tar  4.605** 4.379* 4.886** 3.539 
  (2.169) (1.732) (2.325) (1.440) 
 R&D tar  20.360*** 18.190*** 17.930*** 14.060** 
  (4.280) (2.870) (4.177) (2.177) 
 LITIGATION tar  −1.057 −8.039* −1.936 −7.534 
  (−0.219) (−1.732) (−0.385) (−1.556) 
 FOREIGN tar  −23.420*** −9.228 −22.080*** −14.620** 
  (−3.143) (−1.270) (−2.884) (−2.045) 
 MEZZFIN tar  13.310 11.380 9.842 5.753 
  (1.289) (0.906) (0.921) (0.445) 
 EQEARN tar  1.753 −0.625 2.602 0.411 
  (0.508) (−0.183) (0.754) (0.124) 
 BIG4 tar  2.528 2.477 3.069 2.755 
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  (0.867) (0.689) (1.058) (0.758) 
 FORECAST tar  0.370 0.638 0.548 0.424 
  (0.281) (0.436) (0.420) (0.317) 
 SPREAD tar  −0.268 0.520 −0.315 0.613 
  (−0.305) (0.571) (−0.370) (0.668) 
Acquirer Traits      
 SIZE acq  3.008*** 3.721*** 2.671*** 3.361*** 
 
 (3.196) (3.339) (2.782) (3.234) 
 TOBINSQ acq  0.023 −0.285 −0.253 −0.816 
  (0.022) (−0.216) (−0.230) (−0.581) 
 ROA acq  −4.456 7.638 −5.630 4.100 
  (−0.384) (0.539) (−0.467) (0.282) 
 LEV acq  2.936 7.087 4.637 9.588 
 
 (0.397) (0.834) (0.575) (1.092) 
 TERMFEE acq  −5.375* −6.324* −4.873 −6.255* 
  (−1.740) (−1.856) (−1.604) (−1.945) 
 TOEHOLD acq  −0.288* −0.239 −0.321** −0.321 
  (−1.752) (−1.268) (−1.986) (−1.527) 
 TOP_BTD acq  8.216* 5.218   
  (1.722) (1.391)   
 TOP_PSHELTER acq    21.06** 20.900* 
    (2.139) (1.828) 
 LITIGATION acq  2.612 8.575** 2.475 8.413** 
  (0.851) (2.229) (0.823) (2.188) 
 BIG4 acq  −4.558 −1.421 −4.350 −0.235 
  (−0.895) (−0.223) (−0.751) (−0.031) 
Deal Traits      
 N_BIDDER  −2.084 0.748 −2.558 1.344 
  (−0.501) (0.124) (−0.656) (0.234) 
 TENDER  2.530 5.601 3.339 4.786 
 
 (0.870) (1.628) (1.057) (1.294) 
 ALLSTOCK  −4.839 −2.043 −4.496 −2.601 
 
 (−1.485) (−0.508) (−1.345) (−0.636) 
 DEALRATIO  4.698*** 5.804*** 4.393*** 5.071*** 
 
 (4.094) (4.756) (3.737) (4.039) 
 INDMATCH  1.567 0.532 1.388 2.111 
 
 (0.637) (0.191) (0.540) (0.754) 
 HIGHTECH  −5.778* −4.035 −6.415* −4.461 
 
 (−1.840) (−1.022) (−1.925) (−1.230) 
Intercept  58.370*** 41.93*** 61.100*** 64.390*** 
  (4.234) (3.304) (4.702) (3.829) 
      
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2  0.37 0.34 0.36 0.36 
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Notes: 
This table reports regression results of takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status. TOP_BTD acq 
(TOP_PSHELTER acq) is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer is in the top quintile of BTD acq 
(PSHELTER acq). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
levels (two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for NONSHELTER tar and its interaction terms) of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
     N  447 447 447 447 
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TABLE 9 
The association between targets’ non-sheltering status and takeover premiums: subsample analysis 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
    
  
 NONSHELTER tar + 4.663** 8.051*** 5.040** 7.398** 
 
 (1.888) (2.435) (1.954) (2.227) 
 NONSHELTER tar ×   –  −15.050***  −10.970** 
 TOP_BTD acq   (−2.358)  (−1.807) 
      
Target Traits 
 
 
 
  
 SIZE tar  −4.901*** −4.863*** −5.899*** −5.964*** 
 
 (−4.441) (−4.173) (−5.820) (−5.194) 
 TOBINSQ tar  −2.724*** −2.429** −3.133*** −2.829** 
  (−2.640) (−2.531) (−2.733) (−2.512) 
 ROA tar  3.581 3.022 9.858 9.562 
  (0.396) (0.296) (1.149) (0.995) 
 LEV tar  −1.601 −0.997 1.114 2.480 
 
 (−0.263) (−0.147) (0.209) (0.425) 
 DACC tar  1.477 0.375 5.625 4.448 
 
 (0.505) (0.131) (1.508) (1.170) 
 TERMFEE tar  6.357** 6.650** 5.394 7.127** 
  (2.058) (1.975) (1.640) (2.010) 
 BTD tar  −47.850*** −44.580*** −40.170** −41.750** 
  (−3.374) (−2.907) (−2.254) (−2.199) 
 NOL tar  7.998*** 6.858*** 6.267*** 5.123** 
  (3.683) (2.956) (2.620) (2.085) 
 R&D tar  23.910*** 20.290*** 25.560*** 22.590*** 
  (4.456) (3.852) (4.444) (4.243) 
 LITIGATION tar  −1.989 −1.611 −0.901 −0.259 
  (−0.388) (−0.306) (−0.171) (−0.047) 
 FOREIGN tar  −21.420*** −22.360*** −20.150** −21.650** 
  (−3.092) (−2.981) (−2.328) (−2.397) 
 MEZZFIN tar  18.170 15.580 19.080* 15.890 
  (1.583) (1.323) (1.657) (1.317) 
 EQEARN tar  0.352 0.550 −1.205 0.140 
  (0.101) (0.144) (−0.345) (0.035) 
 BIG4 tar  2.643 2.191 2.873 2.502 
  (0.880) (0.699) (0.936) (0.766) 
 FORECAST tar  −0.056 0.209 0.339 0.305 
  (−0.044) (0.141) (0.240) (0.187) 
 SPREAD tar  −0.718 −0.586 −0.139 −0.202 
  (−0.731) (−0.590) (−0.143) (−0.198) 
Acquirer Traits      
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Notes: 
This table reports regression results of takeover premiums on targets’ non-sheltering status. TOP_BTD acq 
(TOP_PSHELTER acq) is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer is in the top quintile of BTD acq 
 SIZE acq  3.155*** 2.494** 3.877*** 3.226*** 
 
 (3.138) (2.329) (3.850) (2.957) 
 TOBINSQ acq  −0.363 −0.329 0.123 0.005 
  (−0.342) (−0.292) (0.100) (0.004) 
 ROA acq  −1.050 −1.562 −3.210 −2.327 
  (−0.081) (−0.110) (−0.265) (−0.186) 
 LEV acq  −0.788 1.803 3.772 7.206 
 
 (−0.095) (0.216) (0.471) (0.877) 
 TERMFEE acq  −3.411 −4.099 −4.929 −5.422 
  (−1.079) (−1.201) (−1.487) (−1.420) 
 TOEHOLD acq  −0.258 −0.251 −0.319* −0.294 
  (−1.434) (−1.257) (−1.891) (−1.525) 
 BTD acq  0.642 1.261 0.706 −4.263 
  (0.032) (0.047) (0.033) (−0.139) 
 LITIGATION acq  4.412 3.707 3.484 3.110 
  (1.389) (1.114) (0.993) (0.857) 
 BIG4 acq  −2.517 −0.393 −6.586 −4.955 
  (−0.501) (−0.070) (−1.221) (−0.873) 
Deal Traits      
 N_BIDDER  −6.187 −4.169 −4.248 −1.496 
  (−1.188) (−0.766) (−0.916) (−0.324) 
 TENDER  4.383 2.434 4.169 2.136 
 
 (1.479) (0.788) (1.359) (0.625) 
 ALLSTOCK  −2.790 −3.632 −1.699 −3.216 
 
 (−0.841) (−0.914) (−0.485) (−0.789) 
 DEALRATIO  5.245*** 4.931*** 5.175*** 4.551*** 
 
 (4.226) (3.919) (4.143) (3.571) 
 INDMATCH  −0.093 −0.551 2.483 3.224 
 
 (−0.040) (−0.192) (0.961) (1.040) 
 HIGHTECH  −8.442*** −5.864* −11.49*** −9.758** 
 
 (−3.079) (−1.651) (−4.038) (−2.551) 
Intercept  38.330*** 42.930*** 40.740*** 48.850*** 
  (3.624) (3.450) (3.866) (3.618) 
      
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2  0.35 0.42 0.35 0.42 
     N  410 410 392 392 
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(PSHELTER acq). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
levels (two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for NONSHELTER tar and its interaction terms) of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
 
 
